By Joe Gaetan 
March 25th, 2026

Third in a Four-Part Series

Introduction

The first article in this series examined how strong mayor powers were introduced. The second explored how they function in practice. This instalment explores: what do Ontario’s leading municipal institutions and professional bodies actually think of them?

Some of the answers are neither simple nor flattering

Across academic, administrative, and municipal governance organizations – IMFG, Strategy Corp’s CAO survey, AMO, and AMCTO – a pattern emerges: cautious skepticism, institutional unease, and deep concern about democratic and administrative integrity. While a minority see potential efficiency gains, most question whether the cure matches the disease.

IMFG: Innovation or Democratic Risk?

The Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG), is a non-partisan academic hub at the University of Toronto.

Some panelists warned that Ontario’s version of strong mayor powers does not resemble the American model cited in its defence. Rather than empowering mayors vis-à-vis senior governments, the framework may subordinate them to provincial priorities, effectively making them conduits for Queen’s Park rather than counterweights to it.

Others argued that strengthening the executive could improve accountability and reinforce a city-wide perspective.

Most striking is the minority-rule provision introduced under Bill 39. Bylaws deemed to be aligned with provincial priorities may pass with support from only one-third of council. This has no parallel in western democracies and a departure from longstanding democratic norms.

The institute also raised structural concerns: Will politicization of the public service intensify? Do all mayors have the administrative capacity to manage expanded powers? How will this framework function in smaller municipalities. The conclusion was not that strong mayor powers will necessarily fail – but that their long-term implications for autonomy, accountability, and democratic legitimacy remain uncertain and are potentially profound.

CAOs: Frustration Inside the Machine

If IMFG provides the theoretical critique, Ontario’s Chief Administrative Officers provide the lived experience.

Strategy Corp’s confidential CAO survey reveals sharp divisions – but the dominant tone is frustration. Many senior administrators describe the legislation as unnecessary and destabilizing, arguing it attempts to solve a problem that did not exist. Nearly three years in, there is little evidence that housing supply – the stated rationale for the powers – has measurably improved.

Concerns are practical and immediate: the line between politics and administration is blurring; council dynamics are shifting; some elected members feel sidelined; and employment security for senior leaders is more uncertain.

Some mayors have delegated certain authorities back to council or the CAO. Delegation is reversible – that reversibility could create instability.

With the 2026 municipal election approaching, CAOs express unease. A new mayor could adopt a very different approach.

AMO: A Democratic Line in the Sand

The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), representing more than 400 municipal councils, drew a firm line on two elements: the unilateral hiring and firing authority over senior staff, and, the one-third voting threshold.

AMO warned that concentrated authority over department heads runs counter to good corporate governance practice.

The AMO has stated that allowing, bylaws for example, to pass with the support of only one-third of council violates basic democratic principles and norms. Such a mechanism risks disenfranchising elected councillors and destabilizing municipal governance.

AMO’s own survey underscores the following concern: 77 percent of mayors and 95 percent of councillors reported that they do not support the new powers.

AMCTO: Administrative Strain and Blurred Lines

The Association of Municipal Managers, Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario (AMCTO) provides detailed operational data.

While many mayors have retained powers related to CAO appointments and committee structures, relatively few have aggressively exercised them. Yet even limited use has generated administrative strain: inconsistent legislative interpretation: additional burdens on staff; blurred accountability lines; and uncertainty regarding liability and professional neutrality.

AMCTO research – echoed in the CAO survey – finds no measurable correlation between the use of strong mayor powers and increased housing starts. The central promise of the legislation remains unproven.

At the same time, AMCTO reports that the framework is altering workplace dynamics. Staff are tasked with implementing mayoral directives that may bypass traditional consultation processes, creating reputational and operational risk. Even when powers are not exercised, their retention leaves employment stability and organizational structure subject to unilateral change.

A Converging Institutional Message

Across these organizations, three themes converge:

• Democratic legitimacy concerns, particularly regarding minority-rule thresholds:
  • Blurring of political and administrative roles, with risks to staff neutrality; and
  • Unclear evidence that the powers are achieving their stated housing objective.

Strong mayor powers were introduced as tool targeted to build homes faster. Instead, they have reshaped municipal governance architecture – altering relationships between mayors, councils, staff, and the province.

The housing crisis may have triggered the reform, but the implications extend far beyond housing.

The fourth and final article in this series examines how these powers have played out in Burlington.

Strong Mayor Powers Part 1

Joe Gaetan has a Bachelor’s degree in General Studies in Applied Studies from Athabasca University.  He started his studies at the University of Waterloo, due to a job transfer to Alberta he finished his degree at Athabasca University.